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RESURRECTING THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: 
COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION AND IDEA 
PROTECTION IN MONTZ v. PILGRIM FILMS 
Abstract: On May 4, 2011, in Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an implied-in-fact 
contract claim survived preemption by the Copyright Act of 1976 because 
it was qualitatively different from a copyright claim. It did so by applying a 
permissive interpretation of the extra element test. Under this interpreta-
tion, the contract claim alleged an extra element that transformed the na-
ture of the action. This Comment argues that this narrow interpretation 
of the Copyright Act’s preemption clause was correct because it provides 
idea-creators with greater protection for their creative concepts and con-
forms with the Copyright Act’s underlying goals. 
Introduction 
 From 1996 to 2003, Larry Montz, a parapsychologist, and his pro-
duction partner, Daena Smoller, pitched an idea to various studios and 
producers for a television series about paranormal investigations.1 In 
their conception, the show would follow a team of paranormal investi-
gators, who would visit real world locations and use tools such as mag-
nometers and infrared cameras to corroborate or debunk reports of 
paranormal activity.2 Each studio, however, indicated a lack of interest 
in the project.3 Yet, according to Montz and Smoller, in 2006 NBC Uni-
versal, Inc. (NBC) partnered with Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. to 
produce a show—Ghost Hunters—on the SyFy Channel, based on their 
ideas.4 
                                                                                                                      
1 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz I ), 606 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 
2010), reh’g en banc granted, 623 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 649 F.3d 975 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011). The Rhine Research Center, which studies human 
consciousness, defines parapsychology as “[t]he scientific study of certain paranormal or 
ostensibly paranormal phenomena, in particular, ESP and [psychokinesis].” A Glossary of 
Terms Used in Parapsychology, Rhine Research Ctr. (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www. 
rhine.org/glossary.htm. 
2 Id. 
3 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz II ), 649 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011). 
4 Id. 
209 
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 As a result, Montz filed suit against several television networks and 
producers, alleging that the networks and producers had misappropri-
ated Montz’s concept for a television series without compensating or 
crediting them for its use.5 Further, Montz asserted that his rights were 
protected by California implied-in-fact contract law.6 Yet, in June 2010, 
in Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz I ), a panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that federal copyright law 
preempted Montz’s contract claim.7 After rehearing the case en banc, 
the Ninth Circuit, in Montz II, reversed the panel’s decision, concluding 
that Montz’s contract claim survived preemption because it included 
an extra element that qualitatively differentiated it from a federal copy-
right claim.8 
 These differing results exemplify courts’ difficulty in choosing be-
tween a broad or narrow application of copyright preemption.9 To pro-
tect idea-creators’ creative property and place them on equal footing 
with producers, however, courts should follow the Montz II court’s ex-
ample and narrowly construe copyright preemption.10 By permitting 
implied-in-fact contract protection of ideas, courts can incentivize in-
novation without undermining the underlying purposes of federal 
copyright law.11 
 This Comment evaluates the divergent reasoning and dramatic 
consequences of the Montz I and Montz II decisions.12 Part I surveys the 
relevant law and introduces the parties and the history of their claims.13 
Then, Part II analyzes the panel and en banc courts’ competing inter-
pretations of the plaintiffs’ allegations and considers the impact of 
those interpretations on courts’ application of the “extra element” pre-
                                                                                                                      
5 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1155–56. 
6 Id. at 1156. 
7 Id. at 1158. 
8 Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976–77. 
9 Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (employing a nu-
anced equivalency test); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(employing a strict equivalency test); see 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer 
on Copyright § 19D.03[C][2] (2010) (examining copyright preemption in terms of state 
contract law). 
10 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981; Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the 
Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 703, 772–73 (2006) (describing 
the benefits of limited state law protection of ideas). 
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006); Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 
132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748, 1976 WL 14045; Miller, supra note 
10, at 772–73. 
12 See infra notes 16–106 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 16–51 and accompanying text. 
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emption test.14 Finally, Part III considers the policy implications of the 
Montz II decision and argues that the decision will positively affect idea-
creators in California by providing them with greater protection of 
their creative concepts.15 
I. Montz Navigates Copyright Preemption 
A. The Copyright Act of 1976: Preemption and the Extra Element Test 
 Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 as a federal protection 
for published and unpublished works of original authorship.16 Specifi-
cally, the Act extends copyright protection to “original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” including written 
works, like screenplays, and audiovisual works, like motion pictures.17 
This protection entitles the copyright holder to a number of rights.18 
For example, under section 106, the owner of a copyright has the ex-
clusive right to use and reproduce the copyrighted work.19 Notably, 
however, copyright law does not offer protection to ideas or concepts.20 
 Before Congress consolidated federal copyright law in the Copy-
right Act, state laws provided a patchwork of protection.21 Those laws 
were subject only to constitutional preemption and were generally 
                                                                                                                      
14 See infra notes 52–75 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 76–106 and accompanying text. 
16 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Until 1978, unpublished works were protected by “common law 
copyright.” Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 19D.01[B]. This state law regime provided 
generally the same protections as federal copyright law, and was eventually embraced by 
the Copyright Act. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). In California, however, state statutes provided 
protection for both unpublished works and ideas. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, 
§ 19D.01[B]. California law was amended in 1947 to eliminate protection of unpublished 
concepts, but this change was met by protest from writers in the entertainment industry. 
Id. California courts responded to the outcry, culminating in the California Supreme 
Court’s 1956 decision in Desny v. Wilder. See 299 P.2d 257, 269–70 (Cal. 1956); infra notes 
24–26 and accompanying text. 
17 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
18 Id. § 106. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. § 102(b). The Copyright Act’s lack of protection for ideas is consistent with the 
longstanding jurisprudential view that “ideas are ‘free as air.’” Nimmer & Nimmer, supra 
note 9, § 19D.01[B]; see Margit Livingston, Inspiration or Imitation: Copyright Protection for 
Stage Directions, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 427, 445–47 (2009) (explaining the necessity of stage direc-
tors to memorialize their stage directions and ideas during the rehearsal process on video 
or in prompt books so as to establish copyright protection). 
21 See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 898 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
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permitted to coexist with similar federal protections.22 Some of these 
state law protections extended beyond federal copyright law.23 For ex-
ample, California created an implied-in-fact contract mechanism by 
which writers could protect their concepts and ideas.24 In the landmark 
1956 decision, Desny v. Wilder, the California Supreme Court held that 
when a writer discloses an idea for a film to a producer with the mutual 
understanding that the disclosure is contingent on the producer’s pay-
ing to use the idea, the parties form an implied contract.25 Further, the 
court explained that copyright law’s policy of not protecting ideas does 
not preclude protection by contract law.26 
 The Copyright Act includes a broad preemption clause—section 
301(a)—which requires two general conditions for federal law to pre-
empt a state claim.27 First, the state law cause of action must be based 
on a tangible work within the subject matter of the Copyright Act.28 In 
a preemption context, however, courts have routinely held that the 
Copyright Act can encompass un-copyrightable subject matter such as 
concepts or ideas.29 Second, the legal or equitable rights asserted un-
                                                                                                                      
22 See Miller, supra note 10, at 707 (describing “the jurisprudential ebb and flow” of in-
tellectual property law); see also id. at 746–50 (discussing constitutional preemption). 
23 See Desny, 299 P.2d at 269–70 (recognizing implied-in-fact contract protection of ide-
as under California law); see also Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 19D.01[B] (describing 
California’s pre-1947 statutory protections as “significantly broader than federal statutory 
copyright”). 
24 See Desny, 299 P.2d at 269; Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 
1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (“The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea 
by copyright does not prevent its protection by contract.”). An implied-in-fact contract is 
one in which the existence and terms are manifested by the conduct of the parties. Cal. 
Civ. Code § 1621 (West 2011). 
25 Desny, 299 P.2d at 277. Some courts, including the Montz II majority, have concluded 
that it is standard custom and practice in the entertainment industry to form an implied 
contract during a pitch meeting. See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 978–79, 981. Critics have called 
this reasoning conclusory. See, e.g., Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 19D.05[A][2][c] 
(“It is doubtful that there actually exists, today, any industry custom to pay for ideas . . . . It 
would seem that no other viewpoint could pass muster under Desny v. Wilder.”); Anna R. 
Buono & Alonzo Wickers IV, Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.: Copyright Preemption 
and Idea Submission Cases, Comm. Law., Aug. 28, 2011, at 4, 7 (arguing that courts that have 
routinely relied on this assumption should conduct a more fact-specific analysis because 
“there may be many reasons why an author pitches an idea”). 
26 See Desny, 299 P.2d at 270. 
27 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
28 Id.; see also §§ 102, 103 (providing the requirements to establish copyrightable sub-
ject matter). 
29 See, e.g., Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 455 (citing Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 
105 F.3d 841, 849–50 (2d Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997); ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455) (“We join our sister cir-
cuits in holding that the scope of the Copyright Act’s subject matter is broader than the 
scope of the Act’s protections.”). 
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der state law must be “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright.”30 The statute’s legislative history notes 
that contracts, however, should not be preempted because the rights 
protected by contract law are not equivalent to those protected by copy-
right law.31 
 Since the advent of section 301, courts have struggled to articulate 
when a state contract claim is equivalent to, and thus preempted by, fed-
eral copyright law.32 Most courts, including the Ninth Circuit, employ a 
nuanced “extra element” test that turns on the content of the alleged 
promise.33 Under this approach, copyright law preempts a breach of con-
tract claim if one party to the contract merely promises to refrain from 
infringing on the other’s exclusive copyright rights.34 Yet, a promise con-
                                                                                                                      
30 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
31 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748, 
1976 WL 14045 (“Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to contract with 
each other and to sue for breaches of contract.”). 
32 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); Montz II, 649 F.3d at 980–81, 983–86; Glen L. Kulik, Copyright 
Preemption: Is This the End of Desny v. Wilder?, 21 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2000) 
(“Courts are arriving at inconsistent conclusions on the issue.”); Viva R. Moffat, Super-
Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 45, 72 (2007) (“[O]verall, Section 301 is a legislative disaster.” (quoting Jennifer 
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 199, 236 
(2002))); infra note 28 (describing divergent approaches to the equivalency test of copy-
right preemption). 
33 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Md. L. Rev. 616, 630–31 
(2008). In general, most courts have declined to preempt state contract claims, but their 
reasoning varies. See Moffat, supra note 32, at 76–77. The Ninth Circuit uses a fact-specific 
extra element approach to determine whether the asserted state rights are equivalent to 
those protected by copyright. Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967–68 (9th Cir. 
2004); see Moffat, supra note 32, at 72. The Ninth Circuit outlined its equivalent rights test 
in the 1987 case Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., stating: “To survive preemp-
tion, the state cause of action must protect rights which are qualitatively different from the 
copyright rights. The state claim must have an ‘extra element’ which changes the nature of 
the action.” 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fan-
tasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit took a more categorical approach in its 1999 decision ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, in 
which it concluded that two-party contracts are not equivalent to copyright because they 
protect different rights. See 86 F.3d at 1455; Bohannan, supra note 33, at 630–31. Some 
scholars have criticized both schools of thought as unfaithful to Congress’s intent. See, e.g., 
Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 
Calif. L. Rev. 111, 147 (1999) (imploring courts to evaluate contract claims for conflict 
preemption in light of Congress’s intent); Moffat, supra note 32, at 77 (arguing that the 
“[a]pplication of [section] 301 should be primarily an exercise in discerning congressional 
intent,” rather than “mechanically stat[ing]” that the Copyright Act never preempts state 
contract claims). 
34 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 979–80; Bohannan, supra note 33, at 631. 
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stitutes an extra element required to survive preemption if it binds one 
party to do or not to do something outside copyright’s general scope.35 
B. The Ghost of an Idea Takes Corporeal Form, Montz Sues 
 In 1981, Montz conceived an idea for a documentary-style pro-
gram in which cameras would follow a team of paranormal investiga-
tors as they conducted field analyses of paranormal activity.36 Between 
1996 and 2003, Montz and his publicist and producer, Daena Smoller, 
(collectively, “Montz”) met with producers and representatives from 
NBC and its subsidiary, the SyFy Channel, to pitch the idea.37 Montz 
presented screenplays and videos as part of the proposal, but both net-
works declined to produce Montz’s concept.38 In late 2004, however, 
the SyFy Channel debuted the television series Ghost Hunters, which 
chronicled Jason Conrad Hawes and his team of parapsychologist inves-
tigators as they traveled the United States in pursuit of paranormal ac-
tivity.39 
 In 2006, Montz filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California against NBC, the Ghost Hunters’ producers, Hawes, 
and ten unknown defendants, alleging that Ghost Hunters was substan-
tially based on Montz’s concept.40 Montz claimed: (1) unauthorized use 
of their materials in violation of federal copyright law; (2) breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract not to develop or disclose their concept with-
out express consent and, if consent was given, to compensate and credit 
them for their idea; and (3) breach of confidence for appropriating 
and profiting from their unique concept.41 
 In April 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.42 The district court 
denied the motion on the federal copyright claim, but granted the mo-
tion on the state law breach of implied contract and breach of confi-
dence claims, reasoning that those claims were preempted by the Copy-
right Act.43 Accordingly, the district court dismissed the claims with 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Bohannan, supra note 33, at 631. 
36 See Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1155. 
37 Montz II, 649 F.3d at 977–78. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1155–56. 
41 Id. at 1156. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
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prejudice and without leave to amend.44 Soon after, the parties stipu-
lated to the voluntary dismissal of the amended copyright claim with 
prejudice, and the district court entered a final judgment in favor of 
the defendants.45 
 In 2010, in Montz I, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their 
implied contract and breach of confidence claims to the Ninth Cir-
cuit.46 The plaintiffs argued that preemption was improper because the 
rights they asserted under California implied contract law were not 
equivalent to those protected within the general scope of copyright 
law.47 Despite this argument, the Montz I panel affirmed the district 
court’s ruling, but after a majority vote of Ninth Circuit judges, the 
court ordered an en banc rehearing.48 On rehearing, the en banc Montz 
II court reversed the panel’s ruling and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.49 The en banc court found that the rights asserted in the 
plaintiffs’ contract claim were not equivalent to those protected by copy-
right law, and that the claim therefore survived preemption.50 The de-
fendants’ petition for certiorari was denied on November 7, 2011.51 
                                                                                                                      
44 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1156; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
45 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1156. In the stipulation, the plaintiffs agreed to drop their copy-
right claim and the defendants agreed to forego their right under the Copyright Act to 
seek costs and attorney’s fees. Stipulation for Entry of Judgment for Defendants at 2, Montz 
I, 649 F.3d 975 (No. 06-7174), 2008 WL 5509918, at *2. The parties jointly filed this stipula-
tion soon after the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Id. The motion to dismiss stated 
that Ghost Hunters was not substantially similar to Montz’ proposal, as required to state a 
claim for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act. Id. 
46 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1156. A court’s extra element analysis is the same for a breach of 
confidence claim as it is for a breach of contract claim. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, 
§ 19D.03[C][2]. On appeal, both the plaintiffs and the court focused on the implied-in-fact 
contract claim. See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976–82; Brief of Appellants at 11–20, Montz I, 606 F.3d 
1153 (No. 08-56954). In these types of cases, “[t]he question [of] whether contract law claims 
are pre-empted is nicer.” Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 19D.03[C][2]. 
47 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); supra notes 27–31 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the requirements for copyright preemption under § 301(a)). On ap-
peal, the plaintiffs conceded the first requirement of preemption—acknowledging that the 
materials they presented to NBC and the SyFy Channel were encompassed by the subject 
matter of copyright. Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). They contended, 
however, that the second requirement was not met. See Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157. 
48 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 623 F.3d 912, 912 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting 
rehearing en banc); Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1158–59. 
49 Montz II, 649 F.3d at 980–81. 
50 Id. at 981. 
51 Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, 132 S. Ct 550, 550 (2011) (denying certio-
rari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Montz II, 649 F.3d 975 (No. 11-143). 
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II. Conflicting Applications of the Extra Element Test  
in Montz I and Montz II 
 The split between the Montz I panel decision and the Montz II en 
banc decision clearly illustrates the challenge that the extra element 
test poses to courts.52 On a fundamental level, both courts recognized a 
limited state law exception to copyright preemption based on an im-
plied-in-fact contract remedy.53 That remedy, outlined in the California 
Supreme Court’s 1956 decision, Desny v. Wilder, permitted a writer to 
recover based on a theory of implied contract if a writer discloses an 
idea to a producer with the mutual understanding that the disclosure is 
contingent on the producer’s paying to use the idea.54 
 The Ninth Circuit further developed this analytical framework in 
the 2004 case Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp, in which the court acknowl-
edged a qualitative difference between the rights encompassed by a 
California Desny claim and those protected by copyright law.55 The court 
explained that to state an implied contract claim and survive copyright 
preemption, a complaint must allege that: (1) the plaintiff disclosed an 
idea to the defendant for sale; (2) the plaintiff conditioned disclosure 
upon the defendant’s promise to pay for use of the idea; and (3) the 
defendant willingly accepted the disclosure with knowledge of the con-
dition.56 In Grosso, the court held that a writer’s claim against a produc-
tion company for breach of implied contract was not preempted be-
cause it alleged an extra element required to state a Desny claim.57 The 
extra element—the producer’s implied agreement to compensate the 
writer for use of the writer’s work—transformed the nature of the ac-
tion.58 
                                                                                                                      
52 Compare Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz II ), 649 F.3d 975, 976–77 (9th 
Cir.) (applying extra element test permissively), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011), with Montz 
v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz I ), 606 F.3d 1153, 1155–56 (9th Cir.) (applying 
extra element test narrowly), reh’g en banc granted, 623 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 
649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011). 
53 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976–77; Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1155–56. 
54 299 P.2d 257, 269–70 (Cal. 1956); see Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 
967–68 (9th Cir. 2004). 
55 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967–68; see Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976; Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157–58; 
Desny, 299 P.2d at 270. 
56 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967; see Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981; Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157–58; 
Desny, 299 P.2d at 270 (cementing the requirements for implied-in-fact contract protection 
of ideas in California). 
57 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967–68. 
58 Id. at 968 (“[A]n extra element . . . transforms the action from one arising under 
the ambit of the federal statute to one sounding in contract.”). 
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 In applying this framework in Montz, however, the panel and en 
banc courts reached strikingly different conclusions about the terms of 
the alleged contract and whether the plaintiffs’ rights under that con-
tract were equivalent to those protected by copyright law.59 
 The Montz I panel distinguished the implied contract between 
Montz and the defendants from the one alleged in Grosso.60 The panel 
reasoned that in Grosso, the plaintiff’s pitch of his concept was essentially 
an offer of sale.61 In Montz I, however, the panel interpreted Montz’s 
pitch as an offer to partner with the defendants in the production of the 
concept, not as an offer to sell his idea.62 By declining to partner with 
Montz, the defendants rejected his offer.63 According to the panel, the 
defendants subsequently made an implied promise to refrain from us-
ing or exploiting the plaintiffs’ words or concepts without express con-
sent.64 The rights protected by this contract were, in the panel’s opin-
ion, equivalent to those protected by section 106 of the Copyright Act.65 
Therefore, the plaintiffs’ expectation of payment for use of their con-
cept was “merely derivative” of their exclusive monopoly to use and au-
thorize use of their work protected by the Copyright Act, and not based 
on the defendants’ implied agreement to pay.66 As a result, the panel 
found that the implied contract did not constitute an extra element to 
qualitatively differentiate the plaintiffs’ state law claims from a copyright 
cause of action.67 
 Conversely, the Montz II en banc court found no difference be-
tween Montz’s contract—which offered use of a concept in considera-
tion of partnership and a share of the profits—and the contracts al-
leged in Grosso and Desny, which conditioned use on payment.68 In all 
three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that they disclosed their ideas based 
on a reasonable expectation of compensation.69 According to the 
Montz II court, even though the defendants declined to partner with 
Montz to develop the concept into a television series, the terms of use 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976 (finding an extra element such that Montz’ contract 
claim survived preemption); Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1158 (affirming copyright preemption of 
Montz’s implied-in-fact contract claim). 
60 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157–58; see Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967–68. 
61 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1158; see Grosso, 383 F.3d at 968. 
62 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1157–58. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1158. 
65 Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
66 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1158; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
67 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1158; see Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967–68. 
68 Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976; see Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967; Desny, 299 P.2d at 260–61. 
69 Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976; see Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967; Desny, 299 P.2d at 260–61. 
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remained the same.70 Thus, if and when the defendants did produce a 
show based on Montz’s concept, Montz would still deserve compensa-
tion under the contract.71 The court explained that this right to com-
pensation is qualitatively different than—not derivative from—the 
rights protected by federal copyright law.72 This is because a copyright 
creates a public monopoly, whereas an implied contract is a personal 
agreement between the contracting parties.73 Further, the court con-
cluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants vol-
untarily accepted the plaintiffs’ disclosure of their concept for sale and 
were aware of the plaintiffs’ expectations of payment.74 Moreover, it 
held that the defendants’ implied promise of compensation for the use 
of the plaintiffs’ concept constituted an extra element such that the 
plaintiffs’ contract claim survived preemption.75 
                                                                                                                     
III. Idea Protection Levels the Playing Field 
 The different applications of the extra element test in Montz I and 
Montz II have vast implications for idea-creators like Montz.76 These 
cases illuminate the narrow gap in law between copyright and contract 
protection.77 Courts should follow the lead of Montz II and permit idea-
creators to protect their ideas through implied-in-fact contracts.78 
 
70 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 981. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See Kulik, supra note 32, at 27–29; see also Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. 
(Montz II ), 649 F.3d 975, 976–77, 981 (9th Cir.) (applying a broad interpretation of the 
extra element test, thereby permitting protection of ideas through implied-in-fact con-
tract); cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011); Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz 
I), 606 F.3d 1153, 1157–58 (9th Cir.) (construing the extra element test narrowly), reh’g en 
banc granted, 623 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 550 (2011). 
77 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981; Nory Miller, Note, Selection Processes: An Inadvertent Gap 
in Intellectual Property Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1009, 1009 (1987) (stating that a “patchwork 
approach” to idea protection “has led to gaps in coverage, which result not from policy 
choice but from inadvertence”). 
78 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981; Miller, supra note 10, at 768 (“Contract claims, whether 
express or implied, should survive preemption [by the Copyright Act].”). 
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A. Implied-in-Fact Contract Protection Was Montz’s Only Remedy 
 In Montz, the district court dismissed Montz’s copyright infringe-
ment claim.79 As a result, Montz’s only recourse to protect his concept 
was through state contract law.80 Yet on appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel, 
concluding that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated two implied-in-fact con-
tracts, held that their state claims were preempted by the Copyright 
Act.81 In doing so, the court not only denied Montz relief under copy-
right law, but also used copyright preemption to dismiss Montz’s state 
law contract claims.82 In sum, this ruling ensured that Montz would 
have no way to recover for the defendants’ alleged unauthorized use.83 
 Recognizing the repercussions of the panel’s decision, the Ninth 
Circuit granted a motion for rehearing en banc.84 The en banc court 
reversed the panel and allowed the plaintiffs to move past summary 
judgment and conduct discovery on their state law claims.85 Although 
the court did not ensure victory for the plaintiffs, it did provide them 
with a forum in which to present their arguments.86 
B. Idea Protection Promotes Fairness and Respects Copyright 
 In the absence of federal protection of ideas, courts should recog-
nize that state law implied-in-fact contracts are often the sole means by 
which authors can enforce their rights in their own ideas.87 Protecting 
                                                                                                                      
79 Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1156. 
80 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981. Additionally, courts have held that the Copyright Act 
preempts many other state law causes of action because the state actions protect rights 
equivalent to those within the scope of copyright and do not allege an extra element. See 
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 9, § 19D.03[B]. These include: conversion, interference 
with contract or prospective business advantage, misappropriation, misrepresentation, 
unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and quasi-contract. See id. § 19D.03[B][1]–[7]. 
81 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981 (criticizing Montz I implicitly for “trying to limit protec-
tion to [plaintiffs] who seek payment, and exclude [those] who want a piece of the action 
and contractual agreement on the terms of the defendant’s use”); Montz I, 606 F.3d at 
1158. 
82 See Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1156, 1158. 
83 See id. 
84 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 978. 
85 See id. at 981. 
86 See id. 
87 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981. Some commentators have 
proposed a federal statutory scheme for idea protection intended to simplify this area of 
law and eliminate jurisdictional inconsistencies. See Kenneth Basin & Tina Rad, “I Could 
Have Been a Fragrance Millionaire”: Toward a Federal Idea Protection Act, 56 J. Copyright Soc’y 
U.S.A. 731, 758–66 (2009) (proposing a uniform statute “governing all aspects of idea 
theft law,” including the elements of a claim and a system for calculating damages). 
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the rights of idea-creators is both important and reasonable.88 First, 
doing so does not conflict with the purpose and policies underlying the 
Copyright Act.89 Second, particularly in the entertainment industry, 
protecting the rights of idea-creators reduces the vast gap in bargaining 
power between authors and production studios.90 
 Providing contract protection to idea-creators is not contrary to 
the purpose of the Copyright Act because contract protection is lim-
ited.91 Bilateral contracts governing the use of a work or concept affect 
only the contracting parties and do not limit the rights of the general 
public.92 As the Montz II court explained, the purpose of a copyright is 
to create a “public monopoly.”93 Thus, in an equivalent rights analysis, a 
state law claim should be preempted only if it asserts monopolistic 
rights in a copyrightable subject matter.94 Therefore, if an implied-in-
fact contract does not affect the rights of individuals outside the pitch 
meeting, the contract must not be preempted by the Copyright Act.95 
 The risk of conflict with federal copyright policy is particularly lim-
ited in idea submission cases.96 Because the idea-creator has yet to pro-
duce a copyrightable work, the idea is not protected by federal law and 
is vulnerable to exploitation.97 Furthermore, an idea-creator will be 
more willing to develop and share concepts if state law provides some 
assurance that the creator can realize a concept’s economic potential.98 
Therefore, allowing state law protection of ideas would actually increase 
                                                                                                                      
88 See infra notes 91–106 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
90 See infra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
91 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 980–81. The House Report to the Copyright Act states that 
“the bill would place a time limit on the duration of exclusive rights” of both published and 
unpublished works. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5746, 1976 WL 14045. Alternatively, an implied-in-fact contract between an idea-creator 
and a producer creates limited rights between two parties. See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 980–81. 
92 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006); Montz II, 649 F.3d at 980–81; Bohannan, supra note 
33, at 650. 
93 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 980–81. 
94 See Miller, supra note 10, at 764. 
95 See id.; see also Montz II, 649 F.3d at 978 (describing how the circumscribed, “bilateral 
understanding” of contract protection is qualitatively different from copyright protection). 
96 See Miller, supra note 10, at 764, 772 (stating that “the risk of conflict with federal 
policy is . . . attenuated”). 
97 See id. at 772–73. 
98 See id.; Rubin, supra note 97, at 665 (explaining that if the television industry con-
dones copying ideas without payment, “there is little incentive to invest in creative ideas 
and all programming becomes comodified, reducing the value of the entire resource pool 
and reducing any incentive for innovation”). 
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the number of ideas available for general use by society, in line with 
federal policy.99 
 Furthermore, a more permissive extra element test would help 
reduce the gap in bargaining power between idea-creators and produc-
ers.100 At a pitch meeting, even though the writer presents the poten-
tially valuable idea, the producer has all the power.101 A producer may 
accept the idea and compensate the writer, reject the idea and not 
compensate the writer, or use the idea and still not pay.102 In the third 
scenario, absent implied-in-fact contract protection, the writer would 
have no recourse.103 Although a producer may face industry sanctions 
for repeatedly appropriating writers’ ideas without compensation, the 
writers themselves are unable to recover damages.104 This is why the 
Montz II court described contract law as “the most significant remaining 
state-law protection for literary or artistic ideas.”105 An implied-in-fact 
contract puts the writer on more equal footing with the producer.106 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Miller, supra note 10, at 772–73 (“Enforcement of contractual obligations in idea 
submission cases should increase the number of ideas and the fruits of their elaboration 
available to society, actually promoting the federal policy of advancing science and the 
useful arts.”). 
100 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976, 981. Even critics of Desny protection acknowledge this 
power disparity. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956); Buono & Wickers, supra 
note 25, at 7 (criticizing Desny protection, but explaining that any sort of express waiver of 
contract rights emanating from a pitch meeting “should be written in plain English, espe-
cially because they often will be presented to unsophisticated (and unrepresented) par-
ties”). 
101 See Jay Rubin, Note, Television Formats: Caught in the Abyss of the Idea/Expression Dichot-
omy, 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 661, 664–65 (2006) (noting that it is 
the producer’s choice whether to honor “the gentlemen’s agreement” or to “borrow sig-
nificantly and directly from . . . those who pitch television formats”). Courts and commen-
tators acknowledge that in today’s economy, ideas are increasingly valuable. See Desny, 299 
P.2d at 265; Miller, supra note 10, at 711–12. The Desny court recognized the value of ideas, 
explaining that in the entertainment industry, producers depend heavily on the ideas of 
others because they “may not find [their] own sufficient for survival.” Desny, 299 P.2d at 
265. According to some commentators, the value of ideas has only increased over time. See 
Miller, supra note 10, at 714. As a result of modern technological advances and the open-
ing of global markets, “the market for ideas is more lucrative, populated, demanding, and 
varied than ever before.” Id. 
102 See Kulik, supra note 32, at 1. 
103 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981; Miller, supra note 10, at 715–20. 
104 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 976–77, 981; Basin & Rad, supra note 87, at 751 (“Although 
some entertainment companies settle, many choose to expend substantial time and money 
defending against [idea-submission] claims, hoping to make a point or to avoid creating a 
reputation that will bankrupt them as a stream of small settlements add up.”). 
105 See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981 (quoting Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 
620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
106 See id. 
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Conclusion 
 Courts should follow the reasoning of Montz II and permissively 
apply the extra element test to allow idea-creators to protect their valu-
able concepts through implied-in-fact contracts. This interpretation 
does not undermine the purposes of the Copyright Act because it only 
permits limited—not monopolistic—protection of ideas. Furthermore, 
offering this protection would reduce the bargaining power gap be-
tween idea-creators and producers and would provide incentive for 
creators to develop their concepts. 
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